Congress the power to make laws in areas affecting interstate commerce, military defense, and civil rights. This delegation of powers contemplates some impingements on state autonomy. Meanwhile the TenthAm . endment reserves powers to the states. With a federal government of limited powers, and states wielding plenary powers, realms of separate sovereignty and polit ical accountability might seem to be the norm. Yet the modern understanding of the Constitution's provisions leaves generous room for state and federal overlap. Within these boundaries, however, Congress can use its lawmaking powers either to leave space for state authority or else to eclipse, or preempt, state power. The Constitution's Supremacy Clause makes clear that state law must yield to federal law as supreme. Preempting state law is not unfair, according to federalism theory, because political safeguards built within the legislative process (such as the fact that Senators are elected state by state) deter federal lawmakers from routinely bulldozing over the states' interests. This chapter focuses on Congress's preemption power and examines the most common legal and theoretical issues surrounding its use.
The two most important questions about preemption are related. The first is for the lawmaker: when, or in what way, should Congress act to preempt state laws in favor of federal ones? The second is for the judge: how do you know that state law has been preempted? In answering the first question, policy makers must consider the relative strengths of federal and state regu lation. A more centralized federal approach promises uniformity, and with it fewer transaction costs associated with compliance, the containment of trans boundary "spillover" effects, and economies of scale. A more decentralized, state-based approach is associated with greater government responsiveness and citizen participation, allowances for regional variability, and helpful experimentation among states.
As for the second question, sometimes Congress's intent to preempt state law is clear and plainly stated in a statute. But sometimes there is doubt. A statute may not declare preemption outright but may conflict with state law;
or it may be so broad as to "occupy the field" of targeted regulation, leaving states with no power in the area. The courts have articulated a presumption, discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow, against reading a statute to preempt state law where Congress's intent is not clear. That somewhat inconsistently applied presumption is informed, in part, by concerns about not trenching on state authority or eclipsing state sovereignty "accidentally" without full consideration by a federal deliberative legislature. Besides exam ining the issues related to congressional decisions to preempt state law, this chapter will also examine the theoretical assumptions underlying judicial reluctance to read a statute as preempting state law.
PREEMPTION AND THE CONGRESS
Reading the Constitution, one might think it utterly clear, as some have argued,2 that the federal government can freely preempt state governments from regulating the environment, pharmaceutical safety, employment rela tionships, or nearly any other subject that is within Congress's legislative authority. After all, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause states, "This Con government failed for several years to give high priority to this regional issue.9
Third, preserving state regulatory authority may also benefit citizens by prompting greater engagement in government. Citizens are often presumed to be able to participate more directly in policy making at the state level.
Greater state autonomy to regulate will mean more opportunities for citizens to participate in governance and seek responsive government. That may result in greater "civic virtue" in citizens by encouraging them to become better informed and more actively engaged in all levels of government.10 Although it has been a benefit claimed for federalism, the goal of stimulating greater citizen engagement may logically lead to calls for concentrating power in localities, such as cities, rather than states. " select more appropriate water pollution standards. In addition, a uniform federal approach will minimize the risk that states will "race to the bottom, "
competing with each other to loosen their environmental or other standards so as to attract new business.14 Recent scholarship by Dean Richard Revesz argues that state regulators likely will select environmental standards that maximize citizen welfare overall rather than "racing to the bottom."15 Other scholars, including Professor Kirsten Engel, disagree, persuasively arguing that politicians may have a strong incentive to be perceived as doing "every thing possible" to attract a new business to the state, including relaxing envi ronmental standards below an optimal level.1 6 At a minimum, this scholarship raises important questions about whether state regulation may sometimes be affected by pathologies causing state regulators to choose less-than-optimal levels of environmental protection.
Finally, a national standard can give each citizen an assurance -even something of an entitlement -to a minimum level of safety, health, or envi ronmental protection, no matter where he or she resides. A single federal approach, without separate state standard-setting, also has advantages for regulated entities. Those who must comply with regulation can face a regulatory regime that is more certain and uniform and thereby avoid multi ple layers of regulation, which not only may be costly to comply with but also may be costly to figure out. This is one reason why regulated entities have frequently sought preemption. Pro-preemption arguments can have particular force when the regulatory requirement consists of a design requirement, such as specifying air-bag requirements for cars. Multiple design requirements could result in very high costs of compliance as manufacturers retool their assembly lines for different state requirements.
A unitary federal approach might also save resources, as only one govern ment, the federal government, would invest its resources in developing regu latory standards. A fully encompassing federal regulation thus might benefit from economies of scale. Congress has sometimes completely preempted state regulatory requirements, as with the federal motor vehicle safety standards.
A very appealing approach is to capture benefits on both sides by creating a hybrid, power-sharing arrangement between the federal government and the states. For example, as in many environmental laws, Congress may specify that federal law serve as a "floor" of minimum protection but that states remain free to adopt standards that are more protective of health or the environment. That gives citizens a minimum level of protection but leaves states free to experiment or satisfy local calls for stricter protection. Even with federal environmental standards in place, some citizens may still face acute localized risks, called "hot spots" by environmentalists; preserving state authority to go beyond federal standards can allow an effective response to these local problems.17 Alternatively, even if a particular consumer product does not violate federal standards, individuals injured by the product may still be free to go to state court and argue that under state tort law requiring, say, reasonable care, the manufacturer should be liable for product defects or failure to warn consumers. The continuing availability of tort claims is likely to prompt the manufacturer to address safety concerns that regulators have not yet anticipated.
In addition, as some have argued in the environmental setting, concurrent state and federal authority furthers the goal of precaution, by ensuring that the more stringent standards, whether national or local, take precedence. States are generally barred from adopting environmental standards that are less protective than federal ones.
Finally, states implementing federal law under "delegated program" struc tures typically undertake signifi cant responsibility to implement a federal program by, for example, developing their own individual requirements that will meet a federal program's goal or by issuing permits to individual compa nies or other entities that must comply with federal law. States thereby may retain greater flexibility to respond to local concerns -and to counterbalance federal authority-but within the framework of a federal program that seeks to address a particular issue at a national level.
Assuming that the states and the federal government do not require, sav, disparate design standards, these sorts of power-sharing approaches can be advantageous and workable. They can help prevent "races to the bottom"
and protect against federal inaction or other regulatory pathologies at both levels of government. However, they still may impose the burden on a partic ular company or entity of having to comply with more than one regulatory standard in a particular location.
Assuming the importance of federalism interests and a state's autonomy to regulate, how might those interests best be protected in a federal regime? One position is that the federal legislative process can adequately protect state autonomy. The Supreme Court has cited this "political safeguards" approach, for example, in declining to judicially enforce the Te nth Amendment, with the exception of the anti-commandeering requirement, as a constraint on federal power over state governments.
According to the "political safeguards" approach, Congress will select the appropriate balance between federal and state authority and will credit the need for state authority and autonomy. But not everyone accepts the "political safeguards" view. Some experts contend that because there is no guarantee that Congress will protect state interests, courts should help preserve state autonomy and authority by inde pendently enforcing states' rights.19 For example, as discussed earlier, judges have been willing to strike down federal statutes as violating the Te nth Amendment because they "commandeer" state resources for use in federal programs. Some also might characterize the judicial presumption against preemption, discussed in the next section, as a lesser form of independent judicial protection of state authority and autonomy. When faced with such a statute in the context of a dispute over whether state law is preempted, courts must interpret the statute to decide whether it preempts the state from regulating. As discussed in greater detail by Professor Schroeder in Chapter 6, a court may conclude that Congress has "expressly preempted" state law, usually through statutory language that specifies which laws are preempted. Courts also may infer (through "implied preemption"
PREEMPTION AND THE COURTS
'9 E.g., Frank B. If the presumption against preemption does not represent a judge's best guess at Congress's actual intent, how else might it be understood? By requir ing a clear statement or some other strong evidence from Congress that it intends preemption, judges can reduce the chance of Congress thoughtlessly eclipsing state sovereignty. For example, if the statute specifically mentions state law preemption, it increases the chances that state law preemption will have received actual discussion in Congress. Thus, absent a clear statement or strong evidence, a presumption against preemption promotes legislative delib eration. Professor Bradford Clark, in Chapter 9, embraces this presumption, rooting his argument in the Constitution's language and structure.
In addition to a procedural bias in favor of more deliberation, a clear statement rule also imposes a substantive bias in favor of state autonomy.
By raising the bar to establish preemption, the rule effectively protects a larger field of state authority. That may serve a judicial desire to minimize congres sional tampering with the federal-state framework and, in the words of the Supreme Court, to avoid "serious intrusion into state sovereignty."24 The effect is to give state autonomy and authority some additional protection in court beyond what states have been able to obtain in the political process.
Although such an approach seems inconsistent with the "political safeguards" approach embraced by the Supreme Court in other settings, advocates of this approach stress the constitutional importance of the federal-state balance and argue that relaxing judicial constraints might put the federal fox in charge of the states' chicken coop. They argue that courts should more actively patrol the line between states and the federal government as part of reinforcing the constitutional structure and supporting the "tradition" of federalism.25
But applying a presumption against preemption also has significant down sides. For instance, insisting that courts always attempt to read statutes without clear preemptive language in the states' favor can force courts to adopt a more "federalist" interpretation of a statute even when that interpretation is not the best reading of the statute's language. Ours is a country of "laws, not men. ' , , Judges might simply be sneaking policy through the "back door," using the presumption against preemption to impose their own views of the correct bal ance of state and federal power. States can adequately protect the prerogative to regulate through their influence in Congress, and judges should be discour aged from displacing Congress by trying to minimize federal preemption of state law.2 8
On this view, the judiciary might leave the question of state law preemption wholly to the political process, applying no presumption at all. Some argue that the policy choices involved in preserving or preempting state authority to regulate are more appropriately made on a case-by-case basis by Congress, our most democratic institution and the one most accountable to voters. The argument is even stronger, given Congress's clear power under the Constitu tion's Supremacy Clause to preempt state law as part of exercising its other constitutional authorities.
In our view, preemption advocates make a persuasive claim -up to a point. Congress clearly has the prerogative to preempt state law and should not be forced to express that desire in any unusually specific or clear way as long as the ultimate meaning can be discerned. But where there is significant ambiguity, a rule favoring state authority is, it seems to us, appro priate. Such a clear intent rule would foster uniformity among courts and acknowledge the traditional interests in local control, while at the same time preserving for the Congress maximum latitude in expressing its desires. Pro fessor Clark examines compromise positions like this more completely in Chapter 9.
SPECIAL CASES
Disagreements about preemption, in the courtroom and in the academy, tend to revolve around certain kinds of cases in which the merits of federal or state interests seem particularly strong. Such "special cases" often involve questions about which branch is asserting preemption, the nature of the laws being preempted, or both. Another notable case involves federal provisions designed to "save" a role for state decision making. We emphasize the special cases for three reasons. First, they test the endurance of preemption advocates and skeptics by asking just how far each will go in defending a theoretical position.
Second, special cases sometimes point to weaknesses in a background rule, suggesting the need for fine-tuning or even exceptions. Finally, because these cases are drawn from current controversies in law and politics, they acquaint Preemption skeptics argue that regulatory preemption must be carefully contained. Agency officials are not directly accountable to voters, they warn, and agencies lack consistent White House supervision, whatever the executive orders say. Federal agencies are, by design, focused on federal needs and powers rather than state interests. As a practical matter, federal agencies are not set up to evaluate and protect state regulatory powers -and they rarely do.3 6 By invoking obstacle preemption, a creative agency could preempt nearly any sort of state regulation simply by referencing a subordinate federal purpose that is somehow impeded by the state law. 37 Federal agencies are also sometimes subject to "capture" by big business and other powerful lobbies. These practices have created a kind of "special case" analysis in which judges are reluctant to read federal laws to upset "historic" powers, "core" authority, or "traditional" balance. to one side or the other; instead they are negotiated and shared. Modern theories of cooperative federalism and instrument choice emphasize this point. In addition, the categories used to define government objectives, like public safety or homeland security, are too easily manipulated by those aiming for a specifi c result.
Still, it is possible to imagine other special cases where the state powers subject to preemption seem unusually important or deserving of protection. In Chapter 4, for example, Professor Morrison would require a clear statement of intent before a federal law can be invoked to preempt "the core enforce ment activities of an elected state attorney general."51 This rule, in his view, would promote local self-governance, by deferring to local law-enforcement interests pursued by a popularly elected state law-enforcement official. It would promote national democratic accountability by forcing Congress to specifically consider and issue a statement about preemption in this area before its laws could be used to undermine such local law-enforcement efforts.
What Do "Savings Clauses" Save?
As we mentioned earlier, federal statutes concerned with public health or the environment often include a provision that preserves a state's right to regulate in an even more protective way. In the last decade, such provisions, called "savings clauses," have stirred controversy in the federal courts. As Professor Sandi Zellmer shows in Chapter 7, these clauses have received erratic treat ment in the courts. Should savings clauses be interpreted broadly, as preemp tion skeptics argue? Or should they be read narrowly, as urged by advocates of national uniformity? The issue is ostensibly one of statutory interpretation.
But because Congress can usually share or hoard its power as it sees fit, one's assessment often appears linked to views about federalism.
In United States v. Locke,52 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the federal Oil Pollution Act of i990, despite the existence of several savings clauses, preempted Washington State's ability to regulate oil tankers operating in state waters. The Court reasoned that because the savings clauses appeared in a section of the statute titled, "Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation," their otherwise broad language must be restricted to liability rules and could not be read to permit "substantive regulation of a vessel's primary conduct."53 stated very clearly. We may be approaching the point where "clear state ments" are necessary both to invoke and to avoid preemption. The answer to the second question is in the eye of the beholder. Although the presumption against preemption is in no danger of abandonment, it does -in our viewoccasionally get misplaced.
CONCLUSION
As American federalism makes clear, redundancy is complicated. The push me-pull-you model of shared government offers big advantages, such as dem ocratic responsiveness, innovation, and flexibility. But the costs are real, not the least of which is the judicial effort necessary to keep all players within their appropriate bounds. What makes this area of the law so fascinating is that, if you study it long enough, it will inevitably pit your principles against a desired outcome. States' rights look good to an environmentalist favoring stricter auto pollution laws in California or safer standards at New Jersey chemical plants.
But states' rights arguments have also been used by courts to limit the pro tection of the nation's wetlands and immunize state agencies from environ mental citizen suits. Conservatives have the same problem, sometimes struggling, for instance, to show why federal gun restrictions may not be foisted on the states but why federal marijuana restrictions may. 6 1 Although not all of these cases involve preemption, they do involve the basic values at stake in the preemption debate, namely a concern for local democracy and state experimentation, on one side, and a desire for national uniformity and efficiency on the other.
